INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

P.Sudhölter, J.Rosenmüller

Working-Paper No. 257

June 1996

Abstract

This series of papers exhibits to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' game in extensive form that preserves all symmetries of the former one. The operation defined this way respects the restriction of games to subgames and yields a minimal total rank of the tree involved. Moreover, by the above requirements the 'canonical extensive game form' is uniquely defined.
Part II is devoted to the discussion representation of strategic forms, the notion of symmetrizations of an atom, and the time-structured mapping which assigns the 'canonical representation' to a strategic game form.

Keywords: Games, Extensive Form, Normal Form, Strategic Form

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