T'oegye's Discussion of Diagrams B and C
The first of these diagrams is the work of Ch'eng
Fu-hsin, and it is accompanied by his explanation. As for
the other two diagrams, I have made them myself, attempting to
get to the source of what is meant by the sayings and instruction
established and handed down by the sages and wise men.
DIAGRAM B
Diagram B takes up [the nature] as embodied in the endowment
of material force, but singles out the original nature,
126 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
"
that is, the nature as it is when [distorted by] no admixture
of [imperfect] material force. This is what Tzu Ssu speaks of
when he says the nature is the Heavenly Mandate,14 the nature
Mencius refers to when he says that the nature is
[perfectly] good.15 When Ch'eng I says that the nature is the
same as li16 and when Chang Tsai speaks of the nature
which is [identical with] that of Heaven and Earth,17 it is this
to which they refer.
Since the nature is here considered in this way, when it
issues as feelings they likewise are considered only as good.
These are what Tzu Ssu refers to as feelings which are "perfectly
measured,"18 the feelings Mencius refers to as the "Four
Beginnings."19 They are the feelings of which Ch'eng I says,
"How can one term them 'not good,'"20 and of which Chu Hsi says,
"That which flows forth from the nature is originally nothing but
good."21
DIAGRAM C
Diagram C takes up the matter in terms of li as it is
conjoined with material force. This is what Confucius referred to
as the nature which is "quite similar [in men at birth],"22 and
what Ch'eng I meant when he said, "The nature is the same as
material force and material force the same as nature."23 It is
what Chang Tsai calls "the physical nature,"24 and what Chu Hsi
refers to when he says, "Although it is in the midst of material
force, material force is material force and the nature is the
nature; they do not become mixed with one another."25 Since the
nature is considered in this way, when it issues as feelings, it
is likewise said that being interdependent they may damage one
another, [with the feelings becoming wrong as a result].26
If one considers the Four Beginnings, principle issues and
material force follows in accord. Of themselves, they are purely
good and without evil; only if principle's issuance is obstructed
by material force before it is complete can they then
degenerate
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
" 127
into what is not good. As for the Seven feelings, material
force issues and li "mounts" it.27 They likewise have
nothing in them which is not good; but if material forces'
issuance is not properly measured and obliterates principle, they
get out of control and become evil.
[The interrelation of principle and material force] being
thus, Master Ch'eng [Hao] said, "If one discusses the nature but
does not consider material force, it is incomplete; if one
discusses material force without considering the nature, there is
a lack of clarity. If one treats them as two, it is incorrect."28
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Tzu Ssu and Mencius were
"incomplete" when they spoke only with reference to principle
[i.e., the original nature]. They did so only because if
they had spoken of it as combined with material force they would
not have been able to show the original goodness of the nature.
This is the significance of the second diagram.
The essence of the matter is this: that which includes both
principle and material force and combines and governs the nature
and the feelings is the mind; and the moment of the nature's
issuance as feelings is the subtle wellspring of the whole mind,
the pivot of ten thousand transformations, the separation point
of good and evil. If one who pursues learning is truly able to
recollect himself through maintaining mindfulness and does not
confuse principle with human desires but brings the greatest
caution to bear on this matter, and if his application to the
composure [of his mind] and the nurturing [of his nature] before
the mind is aroused is profound and he is likewise
well-versed in the exercise of reflection and discernment
after it is aroused, and if he accumulates truth and is constant
in his effort for a long time and does not stop, then the
learning of sagehood characterized as "being discerning and
undivided, holding fast the mean,"29 and the method of
cultivating the mind wherein it is composed in substance and
[accurately] responsive in function, need not be sought
elsewhere, but will all be attained in this.
128 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
"
Commentary
The first two sections of this commentary will deal mainly
with matters essential to general Neo-Confucian
psychological theory, which are summarized in Diagram A and its
accompanying remarks. Subsequent sections of commentary will be
addressed to the main issues and questions involved in the
Four-Seven Debate, the conclusions of which are
expressed in Diagrams B and C and their accompanying
remarks.
Mind, Nature, Feelings, and Intention
Mind is the subject that possesses principle as its
substance or nature, and has feelings as its function, the
concrete and active manifestation of substance. Being endowed
with all principle as its substance renders the mind responsive
to all things in existence; actively responding in a concrete
instance is a matter of feelings, which are not a distinct
faculty, as in the Aristotelian analysis, but the active issuing
forth of responses in the modality provided by the principle of
our nature. Being concrete and particular, actual feelings are on
the side of material force, though what they manifest, ideally,
is principle.
The distinctive role of mind, the subject and nexus of
principle and material force, is to preside over this issuance of
principle in its active, material force manifestation as the
feelings that arise in response to concrete situations. This
presiding function is essentially expressed in terms of
self-possession (mindfulness), whereby distorting elements
(basically forms of self-centeredness which arise as the
psychic manifestation of the imperfection or turbidity of
material force) are controlled and excluded so that principle may
issue forth integrally and be perfectly manifested in the
character of appropriate feelings.
The typical western analysis regards man as balanced between
good and evil and so makes free will, our ability to decide
between them, a central issue. But the Neo-Confucian
analysis focuses on the
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
" 129
moral situation in terms of responsiveness: in the ideal order
the mind's response is spontaneously perfect, but in fact it is
often problematically distorted. Attention therefore centers on
the means to obviate the distortion, i.e., self-possession,
rather than on the role of will as the arbiter of choice. As
reflected in these diagrams, the central items of concern in
describing our psychological constitution are therefore
nature, feelings, and mind as presiding over them; these are
the essential items for understanding how a response arises.
The phenomena we associate with a separate faculty, the will,
are not altogether neglected, however. Sometimes what we would
call an act of the will, the intention, is treated as the
function of the mind, paralleled by describing feelings as the
function of the nature. This, however, could lead to a mistaken
separation of mind and nature by differentiating their
functions,30 a matter T'oegye addresses as follows:
The mind is the thing that combines principle and material
force and governs and combines the nature and the feelings.
Therefore it is not only the intention that issues from the mind;
the issuing of the feelings is also done by the mind. Principle
is without form or concreteness; as it fills and is perfectly
held by the mind, it is the nature. The nature is without form or
concreteness; as it is broadly manifested and issues forth as
function in dependence upon the mind, it is the feelings.
That which, based upon the issuing of the feelings, manages,
calculates, and asserts that it must be like this or must be like
that, is the intention. Since the feelings spontaneously issue
forth, the former Confucians therefore described them as issuing
from the nature; since the intention asserts that it must be such
and such a way, they therefore described it as issuing from the
mind. (A, 36.16a, p. 823, Letter to Yi Koengjung)
In the same letter T'oegye says the feelings are like a
chariot and the intention like the driver's use of the chariot.
The importance of the intention is thus evident. But it does not
call for extensive separate treatment in this framework because
structurally it parallels the feelings; that is, like the
feelings, the intention is understood as an active force
operative in the mind. While it does not arise spontaneously, the
problems associated with it are essentially the same: the
disruptive
130 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. .
. "
influence of self-centeredness (turbid material force)
that gives rise to wrong intentions and subtle forms of
self-deception. Thus in terms of self-cultivation,
the intention attains its perfection of integrity or sincerity
through the same process of constantly mindful application to the
investigation of principle and reflective practice that brings
perfection to the functioning of feelings.
The Two States of the Mind
Diagram A and its explication describe the mind as having
two states, the condition before it is aroused and the condition
after it is aroused.31 This is based upon the first chapter of
the Doctrine of the Mean: "Before pleasure, anger, sorrow,
and joy are aroused it is called equilibrium; when they are
aroused and attain their due measure and degree, it is called
harmony." The passage itself speaks only of feelings being either
aroused or not aroused. But in terms of Neo-Confucian
substance-function analysis feelings were considered the
active function of the mind, with the obvious corollary that when
the feelings are not aroused what remains must be the tranquil
substance of the mind. Thus this passage came to be understood as
indicating not just two states of the feelings, but two
conditions of the mind itself. This is a matter of great
importance for the theory of self-cultivation; the relation
of these states to actual spiritual practice, and just what may
or may not pertain to each, were a perennial source of questions
from students. In the following passage T'oegye gives a thorough
description of the two conditions of the mind:
Man's mind has both substance and function, quiescent and
aroused states, and embraces both activity and tranquility.
Therefore when it is not yet stirred by something, it is
quiescent and is not active; all principles are present and the
mind's integral substance is perfectly possessed. When something
occurs and stirs it and it goes forth penetratingly without
missing the proper
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
" 131
measure, then the mind's great function is perfectly put into
action. If it is tranquil, then it is quiescent and is described
as "not yet aroused." If it is active, then it is stirred and is
described as "already aroused" . . . .
Therefore what your letter speaks of as the condition before
being engaged with something, the time when there is no arising
or perishing [of thoughts, feelings, etc.], what is referred to
as the condition of emptiness and spirituality, bright and with
no dimness, what is called the feelings of pleasure, anger,
sorrow, and joy not yet being stirred, and not yet being
disturbed by thought or verbalizing, these all belong to the
quiescent or tranquil condition, that is, to the condition
described as "not yet aroused."
That which is described as the time when one just barely
begins to think, or what is referred to as pondering, or
exhaustively investigating [principle], or what is described as a
time when one's thoughts are in a turmoil, or what is called
responding to and dealing with affairs, all of these pertain to
being stirred and [going forth] penetratingly and being active,
that is, to the condition described as "already aroused." That
which is described as there being in the midst of perfect
tranquility the beginning of activity, does not likewise mean a
condition which is already active: this is just stated with
reference to there being the principle of activity, that is all.
Therefore this also ought to belong to the
not-yet-aroused condition.
The not-yet-aroused condition is the time for one
to be cautious and fearful;32 the already aroused condition is
the time for personal watchfulness and minute
self-reflection. What is referred to as applying oneself to
being alert, self-possessed, and focused, or keeping charge
[of oneself], this runs throughout both the
not-yet-aroused and already aroused conditions and
permits of no interruption; it is what is referred to as
"mindfulness."
I have carefully examined your letter. Its regarding the mind
before it is engaged with something as quiescent and not active,
and its regarding pondering, exhaustively investigating, and
responding to and dealing with affairs as belonging to the
already aroused condition is acceptable. But when between these
two you further put a condition of being tranquil and having a
slight movement of thought that is not yet formed, and look upon
it as pertaining to the not-yet-aroused condition,
although what this means seems to be subtle and exact, in fact it
is a great error. For if one is tranquil, then he is not yet
active and this is the not-yet-aroused condition; how
can there be a slightly active tranquility which can be called
not yet aroused? If one engages in thought, it is already formed
and this is the already aroused state; how can one have a not yet
formed thought that can be called not yet aroused? (A,
19.39b-40b p. 486, Letter to Hwang Chunggŏ)
132 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
"
This long description makes it unmistakably clear that what in
NeoConfucian psychology is regarded as one of the two basic
conditions of the mind, the not-yet-aroused
condition, bespeaks not just a state of relative calm and
tranquility, but a conscious and wakeful state of absolute mental
quiescence. The western world would regard this as an abnormal or
altered state of consciousness, the kind of thing associated
with meditation practices; in the East Asian world, long familiar
with Buddhist meditation, it is simply accepted as one of the two
polar conditions of consciousness, a psychic manifestation of the
yin-yang alternation of tranquility arid activity.
This does not mean that such a condition can be dissociated
from a form of meditation practice. Quite the contrary: the main
practical import of this description of the two states or
conditions of the mind is that for the first time it provides a
systematic foundation for meditation in Confucian
self-cultivation. Chu Hsi learned such meditation, called
"quiet sitting," a method of "looking into the equilibruim
of the mind before it is aroused," from his teacher Li T'ung. The
exact place such a practice should occupy in
self-cultivation was a vexatious issue that was eventually
settled by the elaboration of the doctrine of mindfulness. It
will be further discussed when mindfulness is taken up below in
the ninth and tenth chapters.
Correspondence Between T'oegye and Ki Taesŭng on the
Four-Seven Question
The statement which instigated the debate was: "The Four
Beginnings are the issuance of principle; the Seven Feelings are
the issuance of Material Force."33 T'oegye heard of Ki's
questioning this and quickly sent him a note toning down the
extremely dualistic overtones of his original statement with a
slight modification: "The issuing of the Four Beginnings is from
pure principle; therefore there is none which is not good. The
issuing of the Seven Feelings includes material force; therefore
they have both good and evil."34 This drew from Ki a
three-page response,35 in which he objected that
basically
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
" 133
all feelings essentially involve both principle and material
force and good and evil; thus the Four Beginnings have no
different status from the Seven Feelings, but rather are an
expression of the Seven Feelings when they have not been
distorted by material force and hence have attained their due
measure and degree. What Mencius expressed as the Four Beginnings
selectively attends to the good side, and although they may be
said to be the issuance of pure principle since they involve no
distortion, it is a mistake to contrast them with the Seven
Feelings in terms of a different kind of differing relation to
principle and material force, for in fact the Seven Feelings
and Four Beginnings are one and the same reality.
T'oegye responded with an eight-page, more fully
elaborated defense of his position;36 he had in the meantime
become more confident in its basic acceptability, for he had
discovered a passage in Chu Hsi's Yii-lei which says simply
and plainly: "The Four Beginnings are the issuance of principle;
the Seven Feelings are the issuance of material force."37 Ki
Taesŭng responded with a forty-two page,
paragraph-by-paragraph critique of T'oegye's
letter.38
Ki's critique pushed T'oegye to advance his ideas and give
them a more precise formulation. He sent Ki a revised copy of his
earlier letter with careful notes on each corrected phrase or
sentence. But more importantly, he accompanied this with
forty-six pages of careful summations of and responses to
Ki's points.39 He began this with a categorical analysis in which
he noted one place where he had misread Ki, four points where his
own ideas or his expressions were wrong, thirteen points of
agreement, eight points in which they agree on a basic level but
draw different conclusions, and nine points on which there is
simply no agreement.40 Then he responded to each of the seventeen
items in the last two categories in turn.
This was T'oegye's final significant discussion in the debate;
although Ki wrote another lengthy and detailed reply on remaining
items of disagreement,41 T'oegye declined to respond in kind,
feeling that much had been gained, the basic points investigated
and laid out, and that it would not be appropriate to push for
absolute and total agreement.42 In 1566 Ki wrote a general
summary statement in harmony with T'oegye's basic position,43
which T'oegye accepted with great pleasure.
134 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
"
Principle and Material Force Mutually Issue the
Feelings
A theory which became clearly enunciated in the course of the
debate was that of "mutual issuing" (hobal, hufa), which
came to be regarded as a hallmark of T'oegye's thought in
contradistinction to that of Yulgok (Yi I), who vigorously
rejected the notion. Ki Taesŭng did not argue with T'oegye
concerning the expression itself, but the implications of what
each understood in this expression were sharply different and at
the heart of the debate. T'oegye states this theory as follows in
the course of responding to Ki's objection that distinctions
according to material force are appropriate in discussing the
constitution of creatures, but not in discussing the feelings,
which are on the level of the compound and inseparable activity
of principle and material force:
Man's entire body is produced through the conjunction of
principle and material force. Therefore these two have a mutual
issuance in function, and moreover their issuing is
interdependent. Since they mutually issue, one can see that each
has a distinctive emphasis (sŏ chu); since they are
interdependent, one can see that they are mutually included
[in the issuance]. Since both are included, there therefore are
definitely cases where they are spoken of as undivided; since
each has a distinctive emphasis, there is therefore nothing
impermissible in speaking of them as distinct. (A, 16.30b, p.
416, Letter to Ki Myŏngŏn)
On one level, this sets the stage for a general distinction of
the two sets of feelings in terms of principle and material
force, for the Four Beginnings described by Mencius are clearly
meant to point to goodness, so their "distinctive emphasis"
is on the side of principle, which is both normative and purely
good. The Seven Feelings, which combine good and evil, are
more on the side of material force, for it is the imperfection or
"turbidity" of material force that accounts for evil.
This is not the heart of the issue, however. If "issuing" in
the case of principle means only that it is manifested in the
consequent feelings, then all proper feelings, the Four and Seven
alike, issue from principle in exactly the same way, and
referring to the Four Beginnings as principle does not
really distinguish them from the Seven Feelings.
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines . . .
" 135
But if principle's "issuing" denotes some sort of
self-manifesting activity of principle, a real distinction
between the Four and Seven is possible even when the Seven are
good: all that is good is certainly so termed because it is in
accord with principle, but all that is in accord with principle
need not be the product of principle in precisely the same way.
This, then, brings us to the causal question that is at the heart
of the debate and manifests the full significance of T'oegye's
"mutual issuing" thesis.
The Causal Origin of the Four-Seven
Distinction
In his response to T'oegye's first
fully elaborated presentation of his position, Ki
Taesŭng laid out the essential difference in their views as
follows, beginning with a paraphrase of T'oegye's statements:
In your letter you regard the Four Beginnings as issuing from
the nature composed of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and
wisdom; therefore, although they are a composite of
principle and material force, what is indicated in speaking of
them has its distinctive emphasis on principle. In the case of
the Seven Feelings, external things touch the physical form and
there is movement from within, and conditioned in this way they
emerge. Therefore they are not without principle, but what is
indicated in speaking of them has to do with material force.
Therefore the Four Beginnings are within as pure principle and
at the moment they issue forth they are not mixed with material
force; the Seven Feelings are externally stirred by the physical
form and their issuing is not the original substance of
principle. And so that whence the Four Beginnings and Seven
Feelings arise is not the same.44 These statements are truly what
you personally have attained;45 therefore in the whole treatise,
although there are time and again various leads on the matter,
the main meaning does not depart from this.
As for my foolish view, it differs from this. For human
feelings are of one kind, and that whereby they are feelings
definitely combines principle and material force and has both
good and evil. But Mencius in approaching the marvelous composite
of principle and material force, exclusively pointed
136 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. .
. "
to the aspect which issues from principle and is nothing but
good. Tzu Ssu, in approaching the marvelous composite of
principle and material force, spoke of it without discriminating;
so the feelings [as he speaks of them] definitely combine
principle and material force and have both good and evil: these
are the Seven Feelings. Truly their approaches in discussing the
matter were not the same. Nevertheless, as for those which are
described as the Seven Feelings, although they involve
material force, principle likewise is included. When they issue
and attain their due measure and degree, they are the nature
which is the Heavenly Mandate, the original substance [of
principle], and are the same reality with a different name as
what Mencius described as the Four Beginnings.46
Whether the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings are only
different names for the same reality looked at from differing
perspectives, or rather truly point to some differentiation in
the condition whence they arise, is a central issue that is
returned to repeatedly. It is the core running through the items
T'oegye cites as matters of fundamental disagreement between
himself and Ki.47 Ki Taesŭng felt that T'oegye's causal
distinction between the Four and Seven was based on an
overemphasis upon the questionable nature of the Seven
Feelings; this leads to stressing the role of material force in
their origination. But if the Seven Feelings' intrinsic
connection with principle or the nature is given full
recognition, and the fact that the Four Beginnings are likewise
stimulated by external circumstances is also taken into
account, a causal differentiation between the two is by no
means as obvious as it first seemed. Ki made these arguments
forcefully and at length, and T'oegye had to accept a number of
his points and refine his own position in order to incorporate
them. Instead of his original description of the Seven Feelings
as "undecided" with regard to good and evil, he now said, as in
our text (Diagram C), that "they likewise are nothing but good,"
and granted that they also express the original nature. The
effects of Ki's arguments are clearly evident in Diagram B, where
the good Seven Feelings are ranked alongside the Four Beginnings
as manifestations of the original nature. That his original
differentiation was not entirely abandoned, however, is also
evidenced in the diagram by the way the Four Beginnings are
depicted as an inner core with the Seven Feelings arranged on the
outside.
T'oegye's final formulation of the relationship of the Four
Be-
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
" 137
ginnings and Seven Feelings appears in Diagram C. It was thus
formulated by T'oegye precisely as a reworking of his
initial loose differentiation of the two in terms of the degree
physical form is implicated in their arising:
Even I, likewise, do not describe the Seven Feelings as being
unrelated to principle but [only] stirred and moved by the
fortuitous meeting with external things. And the Four Beginnings
are stirred and moved by things; they definitely are no different
from the Seven Feelings in this regard. But in the case of the
Four, principle issues and material force follows it; in the case
of the Seven, material force issues and principle mounts it, that
is all. (A, 16.32a, p. 417, Letter to Ki Myŏngŏn)
In this formulation, then, T'oegye means to do full justice to
the role of principle vis-a-vis the Seven Feelings,
and material force vis-a-vis the Four Beginnings.
With due regard to the complementarity and interdependence of
principle and material force and their mutual involvement in
all feelings, he now points to a form of nontemporal priority of
principle in the issuance of the Four Beginnings and of material
force in the issuance of the Seven Feelings.
The Four-Seven Debate and the Understanding of
Mencius
Mencius' description of the Four Beginnings is virtually
synonymous with what the Ch'eng-Chu school describes as the
perfectly good "original nature." Although man possesses
this nature, it is concretized and active only in the context of
material force; considered in this context, it is the
"material nature." If the material force of the psychological
endowment is turbid, like muddy water, then all that issues
through the agency of this medium might be regarded as equally
subject to distortion. Ki Taesŭng in fact views the
situation in much this manner, arguing that in reality even the
Four Beginnings are frequently distorted and so involve good and
evil, just
138 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. .
. "
as the Seven Feelings.48 Whatever the innate goodness of his
original nature, the ordinary man is in all cases dealing with a
mixed condition in which he must exercise the utmost caution and
self-examination. In effect this makes Mencius' description
of the Four Beginnings or original nature less an active reality
upon which man builds and develops, and more an abstract
ideal, a description of what man really is in the depths of his
being and should strive to become in reality. T'oegye has a
rather different view of Mencius:
I characterize the Four Beginnings as likewise involving
material force, the point you have repeatedly stated in the
course of your discussion .... Even so, in your view of Mencius'
explanation of the Four Beginnings, do you see it as likewise a
matter of the issuance of material force? And if you see it as
treating the issuance of material force, then how do you think
one ought to look at what is described as "the beginning of
humanity," "the beginning of righteousness, propriety, and
wisdom"? If you see this as involving even a slight participation
of material force, then it is not the original condition of pure
heavenly principle. If you see is as a matter of pure heavenly
principle, then the basis whence it issues is definitely not a
mixed sort of thing like mud and water. What you mean is that
humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are terms which
belong to the not-yet-aroused state; therefore they
are pure principle. As for the Four Beginnings, they are terms
which belong to the state after [the mind] is aroused. Without
material force they could not act; therefore they also involve
material force, that is all. The way I would describe the Four
Beginnings is that, although they are said to mount material
force, 49 what Mencius was pointing out consists not in their
mounting material force50 but only in their issuing from
pure principle. (A, 16,32ab, p. 417, Letter to Ki
Myŏngŏn)
Real feelings have to do with the actual world of material
force, and hence with the material nature; if one is going to
distinguish the Seven Feelings and Four Beginnings on this level
there must be some reality, not just an abstraction, as the basis
of speaking of an issuance from pure principle. This is what
T'oegye expresses in his formulation of the Four Beginnings as
"principle issues and material force follows it." Within the
interdependent compound of principle and material force one can
distinguish and differentiate kinds of feelings as originating
from principle or being more intimately connected with material
force.
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
" 139
Although all alike are feelings, all involve both principle
and material force, and all may be perfectly good, there is a
real, even a phenomenological difference between them:
The reason the four [i.e., joy, anger, sorrow, and fear]51 are
easily harmful to the mind is that truly what issues
[intrinsically] conditioned by material force, although it is
originally good, easily flows toward evil; therefore it is so,
and that is all. In the case of the Four Beginnings, which
issue from principle, how is there any such problem? (A, 16,37a,
p. 420, Letter to Ki Myŏngŏn)
A similar differentiation also appears in the text related to
Diagram C.
Looked at in terms of the interpretation of Mencius, then,
Diagram B and Diagram C have more significance than might appear
at first glance. Diagram B presents the doctrine of the original
nature, with the added precision that the Seven Feelings when
they are good also stem from and manifest the original nature.
Diagram C is a presentation of the doctrine of the physical
nature. But it goes beyond the common application of this
doctrine as an explanation of the origin of evil, for it also
explicates the existential functionality of the original nature.
Even though the nature is conjoined with material force, there is
a distinctive issuance of the Four Beginnings in which principle
is not only manifested, but also is the point of origination. To
be sure, it does so only in conjunction with material force, but
not in a way that admits the distorting element of material force
in the very wellspring of the origination of these feelings.
The Significance of the Four-Seven Debate
The Four-Seven Debate became a gate through which every
Korean with a claim to significant Neo-Confucian learning
passed. The issues involved are subtle and of a nature which
admits of no final absolute determination upon which all agree;
at the same
140 Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
"
time they involve fundamental questions regarding the
interpretation of the relationship of principle and material
force as applied not only to the feelings, but also as regards
the closely related topics of the original nature and the
physical nature, and the human mind and the mind of the Tao.
These matters are so fundamental in the Ch'eng-Chu school
that, once they were raised and became the object of broad
attention, they could not just be laid aside as could the
discussion of equally perplexing but more peripheral questions
that became fashionable for a time and then were left
behind. Thus the Four-Seven Debate decisively fixed the
intellectual agenda for generations to come; the problematique
that it established served as a general framework within which
other questions emerged and were addressed.
Although these issues are basic, they were never raised with
the same urgency in China, which instead became occupied with
questions concerning the nature and the mind as rival foci in the
competing Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools of
thought.52 Korea, accepting Chu Hsi's basic description of mind
as a composite of material force and principle, feelings and
nature, went on to investigate the fundamental questions inherent
in this description; these could be explored only by an extensive
inquiry into the precise understanding of the relationship of
principle and material force. The Chinese, arguing the
Lu-Wang proposal that the mind itself is principle, were
not led into the same kind of development of the inner problems
and resources of the Ch'eng-Chu school in this fundamental
area.
The Four-Seven Debate, then, established a distinctive
intellectual agenda for Korean Neo-Confucianism. In so
doing, one might suggest, it contributed in no small way to a
closely related and distinctive feature of Korean
Neo-Confucianism: its exclusive devotion to the
Ch'eng-Chu school and the absence of any significant role
of Wang Yang-ming's thought in Yi dynasty intellectual
life, in spite of its great popularity in China. Once embarked
upon this inquiry, the Korean intellectual world had little place
for Wang Yang-ming; his thought was not so much a
furthering of these questions as it was an invitation to abandon
them for a quite different alternative. One might also go beyond
the intellectual level as such to further consider that the
intellectual debate was very soon socially grounded, both in
terms of regional and factional loyalties and in the less
palpable terms of
Diagram of the Saying "The Mind Combines. . .
" 141
prestige, recognition for "learning" accorded to those who
could handle these issues with competence. There was no
similar social reward or gratification for the study of Wang
Yang-ming.
But on a more profound level than this, there is a way in
which the Four-Seven Debate, and particularly the ideas
developed by T'oegye, made Wang's thought less compelling and
attractive. The Lu-Wang school, by equating principle
directly with the mind rather than with the nature, gave full
expression to the dynamic, active side of the original goodness
of human nature as discussed by Mencius. The Ch'eng-Chu
school preserved Mencius' teaching in its doctrine of the
perfectly good original nature, but in the context of the
correlated doctrine of the imperfection of the physical
nature (the nature as existentially embodied in material force),
there was the danger, as we have seen, that the goodness spoken
of by Mencius might be reduced to more an analytic intellectual
affirmation than an existential reality. T'oegye's
differentiation of the Four Beginnings from the Seven Feelings,
however, establishes an existential functionality for the
original goodness of human nature, and at the same time
remains fully within the context of the Ch'eng-Chu school
and leaves the doctrine of the material nature fundamentally
intact.
While the underlying problematique of T'oegye's thought is
quite different from that of the Lu-Wang school, with
regard to Men, cius, who occupies a key place in both
discussions, they do cover the same ground, albeit with widely
different results. Once this discussion was established in the
Korean intellectual world, the Lu-Wang school's treatment
of Mencius might well be dismissed in favor of a more
finegrained analysis that remained fully within the
authoritative Ch'engChu tradition. Wang Yang-ming was
disregarded not only because Korean minds were occupied by other
things, but because with these developments there was little
intellectual need for the alternative he presented.
Notes
. Diagram of the Saying, "The Mind Combines and Governs
the
Nature and the Feelings"
1. On Ki Taesŭng, see Introduction, note 33. He
was only thirty-two years old, twenty-seven years
junior to T'oegye, when the debate between them began. The
learning, tenacity, and thoroughness of his argumentation against
T'oegye were a great contribution to what was attained in the
course of the debate. That T'oegye allowed himself to be pressed
so hard by one so much his junior reflects a rare intellectual
humility and openness on his part, especially in a social context
which normally demanded great deference to one's elders.
2. The courtesy name of Sŏng Hon (1535-1598) was
Howŏn, and his honorific name was Ugye. He was a close
friend of Yulgok, but although he had never studied with T'oegye,
he was convinced of T'oegye's position and debated the issue from
1572-1577 in correspondence with Yulgok. This discussion,
occurring just two years after T'oegye's death, attracted wide
attention.
3. See Mencius, 2A:6.
4. The Seven Feelings are listed in the Book of Rites,
ch. 9. The shorter list of feelings in the first chapter of the
Doctrine of the Mean, pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy,
are considered likewise to represent the seven, and along with
Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean's handling of the
feelings is a major consideration in discussing this issue.
5. See chapter 2, note 32.
6. Chang Tzu chüan-shu, 14.2a. The verb in
this sentence, t'ung, has a range of meaning which
includes both the idea of combining and the associated idea of
exercising governance or command. This ambivalence was fruitfully
exploited by Neo-Confucians, who refer to the saying both
in the context of discussing the mind as the subject which
combines the nature and feelings as its substance and function,
and in the context of discussing the distinctive role of the mind
as presiding over the two; the present chapter is a case in
point. The two discussions are intimately related, and whichever
aspect of t'ung is in the forefront in a given context,
its alternative is implicit within it. For this reason, as well
as for consistency, I will translate t'ung as "combines
and governs," whatever the immediate context, except in cases
where it is used in a compound which singles out one of its
aspects.
7. This description draws heavily on the language of
traditional Confucian formulas. The Book of Rites, ch. 9,
says: "Thus man is [composed ofl the virtue of Heaven and Earth,
the interaction of yin and yang, the combination of the physical
and the spiritual, and the most excellent material force of the
Five Agents." The commentary of Kung Ying-to (fl. c. 620
A.D.) remarks: "Man is stirred by the most excellent material
force of the Five Agents and hence possesses humanity,
righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness; these
are 'the most excellent material force of the Five Agents.'. . .
The combination of the physical and the spiritual, and the most
excellent material force of the Five Agents constitute man's
nature "Li-chi cheng-i, 22). While much of the
language of this description is preserved by the
Neo-Confucians, the introduction of the dualism of principle
and material force and the equation of the nature with principle
are a new departure that transforms the significance of the
traditional description.
8. From the Book of Changes, Appended Remarks, pt. I,
ch. 10: "The Changes is without thought, without action;
it is still and unmoving. When acted on, it immediately
penetrates all things." Here the characteristics of the mind of a
sage are applied to the Book of Changes;
Neo-Confucians reapply the passage to describe the
substance and function of the mind of everyman. Thus it becomes
part of a theoretical framework which will support everyman's
cultivation of sagehood.
9. Mencius, 6A:8; see also 7A:21.
10. Ibid., 2A:6.
11. This paragraph is based on the Doctrine of the
Mean, ch. 1. See discussion below, Commentary, "The Two
States of the Mind."
12. I-ch'uan wen-chi, 4. la. Yen Hui was
the foremost of Confucius' disciples, and was especially praised
by the Master for his love of learning.
13. In speaking with King Sŏnjo, T'oegye says, "The first
diagram was made by Ch'eng Lin-yin, but in his
distinguishing principle and material force there were many
inexact points. Thus I removed them and made the second and third
diagrams distinguishing the original nature and the physical
nature as they are discussed by Mencius, the Ch'eng brothers, and
Master Chu" (ŎHN, 3.27a, B, p. 832). The T'oegye
sŏnsaeng munjip kojŭng, a book of annotations to
T'oegye's Collected Works compiled by the eighteenth
century Korean scholar, Yu Towŏn, gives further details: "In
Ch'eng's original diagram, "mind" was in the center of the circle
with "combines and governs the nature" and "combines and governs
the feelings" arranged to the right and left. Beneath the word
"principle," "called humanity" etc., was absent," in TGCS
(B, 3.32b-33a, pp. 1119-120). When we put these
passages together, it seems likely that T'oegye felt that
Ch'eng's arrangement of words within the circle suggested a
division of nature and feelings according to principle and
material force, an oversimplification which he is careful to
correct with his own two additional diagrams.
14. Doctrine of the Mean, ch. 1. This work was
traditionally attributed to Tzu Ssu, the grandson of
Confucius.
15. Mencius, 6A:6.
16. I-shu, 22A:lla.
17. Cheng meng, ch. 6.
18. Doctrine of the Mean, ch. 1.
19. Mencius, 2A:6.
20. Ts'ui yen, 2.25a.
21. Yü-lei 4. lOb.
22. Analects, 17.2.
23. I-shu, 1.7b.
24. Cheng meng, ch. 6: "After assuming concrete form
there is the physical nature; if one is good at returning it [to
its original condition] then the nature of Heaven and Earth is
preserved in one. Therefore, with regard to the physical nature,
there is that which the superior man denies to be his nature."
This passage was of great importance, for in it Chang Tsai
ennunciates for the first time the key doctrine of a "physical
nature," and points the way to the distinction of what comes to
be called the "original nature."
25. Yü-lei, 4.lOb.
26. That is, material force may by its turbidity distort the
feelings, which would be purely good if their issuance depended
solely upon principle.
27. This twofold formula is famous as T'oegye's culminating
expression of the relationship of the Four Beginnings and Seven
Feelings. The "principle mounting material force" description of
the Seven Feelings is borrowed from a horse and rider image Chu
Hsi occasionally used to express the basic relationship of
principle and material force. However, he used it only in a
cosmic context. It is notable that T'oegye uses it for only one
set of feelings; Yulgok argues strongly that this single formula
must be used for both sets of feelings, there being only one way
in which principle and material force relate, whether at the
cosmic or the human level (See Yulgok chŏnsŏ,
10.15b-16a).
28. I-shu, 6.2a.
29. Book of Documents, 11.2.15. This passage is the
classical locus for the contrasting concepts, "the human mind"
and "the mind of the Tao," making it an essential reference point
for Neo-Confucians. For further discussion, see below,
chapter 8.
30. This separation led to a dispute among T'oegye's
contemporaries regarding whether the nature could be
regarded as acting prior to the mind. See Letter to Kim
Ijŏng, TGCS, A, 30.17a-19b, pp.
685-686.
31. Pal (Chinese, fa), the term here translated
as "aroused," I have translated as "issues," "issuance," etc., in
discussing the relationship of the nature and the feelings in
order to avoid the implication that feelings are something
separate from the nature that the nature acts upon and arouses.
This is usually done by translating pal as "manifests," but this
conventional rendition is inadequate for the context of the
Four-Seven Debate, where the focus of the issue is the
causal activation or issuance of the feelings by principle and
material force.
32. "Cautious and fearful" not in the sense of being anxious
and watchful, which would be active, but in the sense of the
profound reverence and carefulness evoked by the presence of the
sacred, an attitude fully in keeping with a quiescent state of
mind.
33. T'oegye first used this formula in 1553 in emending a
basically similar expression in the Ch'ŏnmyŏng
to (Diagram of the Heavenly Mandate), a work of his
contemporary, Chŏng Chi-un (1509-1561). On the
Ch'ŏnmyŏng to, see chapter 3 note 30. For the original
and emended diagrams, and T'oegye's long preface, see
TGCS, A, 41.1a-lla, pp. 911-916. For the
chapters of explanation, see TGCS, B,
8.12b-20b, pp. 140-144.
34. TGCS, A, 16.1b, p. 402.
35. TGCS, A, 16.12b-14a, pp.
407-408.
36. TGCS, A, 16.8a-12b, pp.
405-407.
37. Yü-lei, 53.17b. This brief
statement seems to be the only expression of this doctrine in Chu
Hsi's works; since Chu Hsi did not devote explicit attention to
this issue, it could not be finally settled on his authority.
38. Sa chil li ki wangbok sŏ (The
Correspondence Exchanged in the Four
Seven, Principle and Material Force Debate), 1.6b-286,
in Kobong chŏnsŏ (The Complete Works of Ki
Taesŭng), pp. 249-260. This work contains the
complete correspondence of both T'oegye and Ki
Taesŭng relating to the debate; it was published and
circulated separately, and was also incorporated into the Kobong
chŏnsŏ.
39. TGCS, A, 16.19a-45a,
pp. 411-424.
40. TGCS, A, 16.25a-28a, pp.
414-415.
41. Sa chil li ki wangbok
sŏ, 2.1a-226, Kobong chŏnsŏ, pp.
273-283.
42. TGCS, A, 17.2b-3a, pp.
428-429. Although he never sent a reply to
Ki's second long response, he did evidently jot some notes in
response to various
sections of it. These have been edited and put together with
the sections of Ki's
original letter to which they are addressed, and treated as if
it were a letter to Ki.
This work appears only in TGCS, A, 17>3a-66,
pp. 429-430.
43. Sa chil li ki wangbok
sŏ, 2.25a-27a, Kobong chŏnsŏ, pp.
285-286.
44. To this point the passage is a paraphrase
of T'oegye's position presented in TGCS, A,
16,9a-10a, p. 406. Emphasis is mine.
45. Ki and T'oegye are both aware that
T'oegye's insistence on a causal
differentiation underlying the verbal distinctions made in the
authoritative sources is an interpretive move that goes beyond
what is explicitly said by Chu Hsi on this matter, although
T'oegye is convinced he is being loyal to Chu Hsi's intent.
46. Sa chil li ki wangbok sŏ,
1.9a-10a, Kobong chŏnsŏ, p. 259.
47. Cf. TGCS, A, 16.27a-28a, p.
415.
48. Sa chil li ki wangbok sŏ,
1.25b, Kobong chŏnsŏ. P. 259.
49. Mencius, 2A:6.
50. The language of principle mounting
material force was applied by Ki Taesŭng to the Four
Beginnings; T'oegye here concedes the usage insofar as it
expresses the interdependence of principle and material force. In
his own final formulation, however, he abandons this image in
describing the Four Beginnings, because it cannot bring out the
priority of principle which is his point.
51. The.discussion at this point has touched
on the Great Learning, com
mentary section, ch. 7, which discusses these four feelings in
negative terms. T'oegye views these four, and the remarks made
about them, to pertain generically to the Seven Feelings.
52. For a discussion of the differences
between the development of ChuHsi's thought in China and the
issues which become paramount in Korea with T'oegye's thought,
see Tu Wei-ming, "T'oegye's Creative Interpretation of Chu
Hsi's Philosophy of Principle."
